Summary: This paper examines Josephusʼ account of a judicial incident that occurred in around 62 C.E., which involved both Judaean elites and the Roman imperial powers. While traditional readings of the passage have focussed on mining it for information about the nature of the Judaean council that is often referred to as the "sanhedrin", it is here argued that this report sheds light on several other key issues related to the operation of law within the region: indigenous perspectives on loci of authority within a judicial context, the importance of judicial power within broader societal conflicts, and the role of Judaean-Roman interactions in maintaining and redefining jurisdictional boundaries. It thus constitutes a valuable testimony for understanding the operation of law in this particular part of the Roman Empire.
Introduction
In around 62 C. E., Porcius Festus, the Roman procurator of Judaea, died while in office. The region was consequently left without the immediate presence of a Roman imperial administrator until his replacement could arrive.
1 At this crucial juncture, the Judaean historian Josephus reports in his Antiquitates what he implies is a rather extraordinary legal incident. In the gap before the newly appointed procurator, Luccaius Albinus, arrived, the Judaean High Priest, Ananus, son of Ananus, seized his opportunity to take control of the judicial sphere. At this point, it is worth citing Josephusʼ account in full:
their view) did not fit within its context, either narrative or historical. 4 But on the contrary: this episode fits the immediate context of Josephusʼ narrative and the general picture of legal argumentation and tactics in the ancient world extremely well.
5 It can and should be viewed as authentic.
The former two points are, however, of great concern to us here. These are also not separate, distinct issues. This passage contains extremely valuable information for anyone interested in the legal history of Roman Palestine, but in order to fully understand its implications, the material about judicial power and institutions must be taken together with the background of societal conflict: the latter is vital to fully understanding Josephusʼ portrayal of the former. Moreover, Josephusʼ account of this incident is rich in the interactions it delineates between the various factions and authorities within the region, the debates between them and the tactics they employed in trying to win greater influence. In these interactions, he brings to the fore themes that he had raised in the narrative which immediately precedes this passage. He then uses his account of this incident to develop these motifs, particularly of civil strife and ‚the law', and to show how they play out in a judicial context. Thus, even if the passage remains indecisive on the question of the exact nature and competence of the ‚Sanhedrin', it nonetheless provides an immensely valuable ancient testimony about juridical issues. This narrative gives us a window into Josephusʼ view of the operation of the judicial sphere at this time, of the sage as interpolated and seeing it as a heavily interpolated result of a very brief authentically Josephan reference to Jesus. The bibliography on the testimonium Flavianum is immense: the references in Paul Winterʼs excursus in Schürer -Vermes -Millar I (1973) 428-430 remain a useful starting point on older literature, and are divided roughly into those who defend the passageʼs authenticity, those who dispute it and those who maintain the interpolation theory. See also Feldman (1987) [55] [56] [57] for an overview of a few further, more recent contributions, and Mason (1992) 163-175, for a good general introduction to the arguments about the testimoniumʼs authenticity. 4 See especially Rajak (2003) 131, n. 73 and Juster (1914) 139-141. Rajak contended that the whole passage should be thrown out based on Josephusʼ inconsistent treatment of the character of Ananus in this episode, who is otherwise given a more laudatory portrayal: in contrast, see Mason (1992) 175, who also observes the divergent treatments of Ananus in the Antiquitates and the Bellum, but argues convincingly that this was because of Josephusʼ different purposes in each work ; Feldman, (1987) 56 also refutes Rajakʼs arguments briefly. Juster (1914) 140-141 argued for the authenticity of 20.197-200 but saw the rest of the passage as interpolated, based in part on what he thought was implausible behaviour on the part of various agents in the episode: this interpretation will be argued against throughout. 5 As will be demonstrated in the following analysis. Thus while the primary purpose of the current discussion is not to enter into the interpolation debates, the following should add force to the vast majority who have seen the passage as authentic. Nothing, however, in the following discussion hinges on the Christ reference, which could still be discarded.
agents involved and where authority -including specifically legal authorityresided. Josephus provides an acute perspective on how legal actors could choose to frame their arguments with a direct view to the authorities they were choosing to approach. Furthermore, he here offers one take on how indigenous authorities could potentially react to, interact with and use external -here, Roman -authorities in what were at base internal political and/or social conflicts, and how the judicial sphere could be drawn into these power battles.
In short, this account informs us about elite perspectives on various key aspects connected with the judicial sphere: tactics of legal argumentation, loci of authority, and how jurisdictional boundaries could be enforced or even defined. This paper will act as something of an extended commentary on the passage, in order to demonstrate the ways in which Josephus depicts these interactions and the possible broader implications of this for the legal history of Roman Palestine.
General Context
The general situation of jurisdictional limits and legal competence bears greatly upon the way we understand this passage, and so the historical background is worth sketching briefly at this point. The question of the juridical competencies allowed to the Judaeans in a Roman context has attracted an enormous amount of scholarly discourse over the centuries.
6 Attention often centres on whether Judaeans had the capacity to pronounce the death penalty, and if so, how far this extended: only to other Judaeans? To foreigners? Roman citizens? tains to both questions, including, as it does, both a capital sentence and a reference to some sort of synedrion, however we understand this. These questions are hotly debated throughout the Roman period and beyond. But while it is generally implicitly acknowledged that the competence to pronounce a capital sentence on oneʼs own subjects was probably allotted in a period of greater independence, the question is more complex when we consider the time in which this incident was supposed to have occurred, when the region, or rather parts of it, were under direct Roman control. In fact, the administrative situation at this point was somewhat fragmented: the region still had a king, Agrippa II, but the extent of his power was extremely restricted compared with his great-grandfather. He received the rule of Batanaea, the Trachonitis, Auranitis and parts of the Peraea and Galilee during the fifties, a fraction of the geographical scope of Herod the Greatʼs (and indeed Agrippa Iʼs) kingdom.
9 He also, however, had charge of the Jerusalem Temple and the right to appoint High Priests, 10 which Josephus presents him as exercising with great regularity. A Roman procurator administered the rest of the region, which was probably by then an independent province.
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Agrippa II is often thought to have been extremely submissive to the Roman imperial authorities in his dealings, to the extent that this was viewed as his 116; Oppenheimer (1998) 185; Jacobs (1995) 248-251; Goodman (1992) 127-139; Habas-Rubin (1991) Vol. I, 64-71; Vol. II, 265-73; de Lange (1976) 33-34. On the situation under Rome in general, even when it is argued that Judaeans had the right to execute people this is very rarely extended to Roman citizens, which would indeed have been extremely problematic: see, for example, the comments of Winter (1964) 494-495, who argues that the Sanhedrin had the power to pronounce the death sentence, but explicitly denies that it possessed ius gladii, i. e. the ability to inflict punishment up to and including a death sentence on Roman citizens. 8 Amongst a great many others, see: Grabbe (2008) ; Clark Kee (1999) ; Goodblatt (1994); Mantel (1961); Zeitlin (1945) 109-140; Büchler (1902) . 9 See Cotton (1999) 75-91 on the administration of the region in the post-Herodian era; see also Schürer -Vermes -Millar I (1973) 472-473 on the geographic scope of Agrippa IIʼs realm. 10 This was explicitly granted to Herod II (Ios. ant Iud. 20.15: τὴν ἐξουσίαν τοῦ νεὼ καὶ τῶν ἱερῶν χρημάτων καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀρχιερέων χειροτονίαν), and seems to have been retained by his nephew Agrippa II: on this subject, see Wilker (2007 ) 205-252. 11 See Cotton (1999 79-81 on when Judaea became an independent province, which was not necessarily in 6 CE; for a different view, see Eck (2007) Judicial Autonomy: Convening a Council and the Roman Authorities
Yet Josephus does not present this control as absolute. Indeed, he describes Ananus as having taken bold advantage of the aforementioned Roman absence to summon a council and condemn certain Jews to death for allegedly being "lawbreakers" (παρανομησάντων). Consequently, this passage is often taken to indicate that at this point in time a council could not be convened without the permission of the Roman imperial powers, whether the procurator himself or Agrippa II as kind of proxy Roman authority.
While I shall not in principle dispute this point, the passage needs disentangling at greater length. As has been noted, Josephus was not a legal historian: despite his claims to have excelled in learning his ancestral law from his youth, to the extent that high priests and leading men apparently consulted him at the age of fourteen, 15 this is a rather different matter from knowledge of the jurisdictional niceties involved in living under Roman imperial rule. Thus, in any assessment of the position and presentation of the council in this passage, the function of the episode in the narrative itself should be taken into explicit account, as should the motivations of the various characters involved in the episode. This is particularly valuable for assessing attitudes towards judicial institutions, and how Josephus at least envisaged legal actors behaving and jurisdictional boundaries being policed. Two points are worth noting. The first is that Josephus presents the primary issue in the resulting controversy not so much as that this group of people have been executed, but that a council had been assembled. Now the one might be inevitably entwined with the other, but in Josephusʼ narrative at least the execution itself is not what causes so much outrage, or at least is not what is the consequent focus of the debate. Nowhere is it denied that such a council, if assembled legitimately (i. e. with the permission of the Roman political authorities, though not explicitly with their consequent active involvement in any proceedings), could execute the guilty.
The next, related, point is that it is a faction of Judaeans who themselves inform Albinus of this: they draw his attention (διδάσκουσιν) to the limits of the High Priestʼs authority. This Roman imperial representative did not become involved in the matter on his own initiative; rather the jurisdictional limitations on the Judaeans are here depicted by Josephus as being policed by the Judaeans themselves. While Albinus is presented as taking action once information about the supposed breach came to his attention, the process by which his jurisdictional authority is enforced should be noted; or at least, how Josephus views this process. Juster saw this point as somewhat absurd, wondering why a Roman procurator would need to have been informed of his rights or indeed why Judaeans would have been so eager to draw attention to the fact they had less jurisdictional competence than they actually did.
16 In his view, this implausible behaviour all 15 Ios. vita 9. 16 Juster (1914) 141: "Est-ce que pendant lʼabsence du procurateur il nʼy avait personne pour le remplacer? Pour arrêter, avant lʼarrivée du gouverneur, les Juifs qui avaient commis une usurpation des pouvoirs? Cʼest se faire une bien piètre idée de l'administration romaine. Mais, ce gouverneur à qui lʼon apprend ses droits? Et les Juifs empressés de dire quʼils nʼont pas le droit déjuger?" As to whether there really was no one to replace the procurator: surely the point is round was evidence that the passage was interpolated. His arguments on this point have already been convincingly refuted, but it is worth tackling this objection again in passing. 17 Our understanding of empire has somewhat changed since Justerʼs day, and I would suggest this picture is not so outlandish as he thought. Most governors were relatively inexperienced in legal matters, especially in the particular regions to which they were dispatched, and it is perfectly legitimate to question whether an incoming Roman procurator would really have known this specific jurisdictional detail prior to his arrival. 18 Indeed, the idea that
Albinus acted based on a complaint made by indigenous elites actually seems more plausible than imagining an all-powerful, all-knowing figure, who would have instantly been aware of this jurisdictional violation and acted upon it. Furthermore, we might also consider how much attention he would have otherwise paid to the execution of a group of non-Roman citizens that occurred when he was not even on the scene. 19 Here at least Josephus suggests that a faction of the Judaean elite took responsibility on themselves for preserving the Roman supremacy. As to why they would do so: this is perfectly understandable in the general context of societal divisions and strife that Josephus creates throughout this section of the Antiquitates, an aspect that will be explored further in the following section. Consequently, while Ananusʼ actions do seem to imply that he believed there would have been greater hindrances to his actions if there had been an immediate Roman presence in the region, this does not necessarily mean that the situation would have been quite so clear to an incoming Roman official. In fact, the limits of the jurisdictional authority of the High Priest are presented by Josephus in the second part of the passage only as part of the opponentsʼ argumentation, not as an absolute, confirmed rule. These limits become a fact through Ananusʼ opponentsʼ presentation of the problem to the Roman imperial representative, who rather whether there was anyone on the scene whom Ananus regarded as having sufficient authority to prevent him from acting, rather than that there was absolutely no one holding the reigns; see also Sherwin-White (1963) 39 on the (in)capacity to delegate capital jurisdiction. 17 It should be noted that Juster (1914) needed this passage to be interpolated in order to sustain his argument that the Sanhedrin in this period possessed capital jurisdiction. See SherwinWhiteʼs (1963) 35-43 lengthy response to Justerʼs arguments; also Burkhill (1956) 91. 18 See the comments of Brunt (1975) 132-36 on the legal inexperience of Roman administrators in Egypt. On how legal knowledge could be disseminated in the provinces, see Kantor (2009) 249-65. 19 The incidental comment in a footnote in Sanders (1992) 540, n.40 is on point: "Execution by mob violence, of course, was another matter (as in Acts 7.57 f.). If no harm (i. e. disruption) came of it, it might be overlooked." The same could be said of other executions: the Roman official in question would have to weigh up the pros and cons of getting involved in what he might see as rather unimportant local disputes, so long as they did not escalate.
Civil Strife, Power and Authority is convinced by their arguments (πεισϑεὶς τοῖς λεγομένοις) and acts to reinforce what he then believes is his jurisdiction. Whether the situation would have been so clear-cut for him before this happened is another matter. In Josephusʼ narrative, this interaction served to clarify, reinforce and perhaps even define jurisdictional boundaries as they would be conceived by a new imperial procurator.
This episode thereby has the potential to shed light on the relationship and interactions between indigenous elites and the Roman imperial authorities and the implications of this for questions of juridical competence. Aside from the way in which Josephus presents the jurisdictional boundaries as being potentially up for negotiation at this point of change due to the inexperience or lack of legal knowledge on the part of the governor, he also depicts a situation in which the legal and judicial sphere are seen as a symbol of power, one which various agents sought to control in order to advance their general position in society. Ananus seizes control of the judicial realm in order to claim back power from the Romans for himself and his own particular faction in Judaean society. The significance of this should not be underestimated: in taking this action once, there was potential to reset the jurisdictional boundaries in a more permanent manner. With an incoming Roman procurator unaware of the exact situation -as Josephus depicts Albinus -Ananus and his faction could present this as a precedent: "Of course we have the right to convene a council -look, we did it before". Whether this would have worked or not is of course another matter altogether. But the potential future implications of such an action -particularly in view of the manner in which jurisdictional boundaries are presented as being policed in this text -should not be overlooked. Ananus was not necessarily being short-sighted in his aims.
Furthermore, on the Roman side, the repercussions for this are perhaps surprisingly mild: Ananus wins himself a reprimand. It is another Judaean -or at least partly Judaean -authority (Agrippa II) who deprives him of his post. Fear of the Roman powers was not, therefore, paralyzing, and exceeding oneʼs jurisdictional competencies does not appear to have always been as risky as we might perhaps have expected.
Internal Power Dynamics and Civil Strife
Judicial fora are inevitably tied to power structures and authorities of some sort, whether ‚official' or otherwise. The power to pronounce and carry out a sentence -particularly, it should be said, a death penalty -assumes that those acting have the requisite authority within their community to do so effectively, and yet the opposite is also the case: seizing judicial power convincingly could potentially have great consequences for either establishing or increasing oneʼs authority within a community.
Indeed, Josephus presents this, as has already been suggested, as Ananusʼ motivation in assembling a council in the first place. The important point to note is that, in Ananusʼ view at least, one key way of staking his claim to social and political power was by seizing control of a judicial institution. He seizes upon the Roman absence to do so, but the targets of his actions are not cast as just the Roman authorities, but include other factions within Judaean society as well. Indeed, in the fallout from the councilʼs assembly and the execution, the civil conflict is made abundantly clear: within the narrative, it is the Judaeans themselves who object to Ananusʼ actions and attempt to foil his attempts. Indeed, those who were the "most equitable" (ἐπιεικέστατοι) among the citizens take him to task, turning both to Agrippa and to Albinus in their attempts to stop Ananus carrying his actions any further.
This brings up a key issue that is emphasized in this episode and has been a feature in the immediate context of the narrative: namely, that of internal civil strife. Ananus is explicitly described here as a Sadducee, a group who are "crueller" about judging than all other Judaeans (οἵπερ εἰσὶ περὶ τὰς κρίσεις ὠμοὶ παρὰ πάντας τοὺς Ἰουδαίους); if we follow Mason in viewing the ἐπιεικέστατοι as the Pharisees, 20 then we have here an episode in the long-acknowledged conflict between two key groups within Judaean society at this time -Sadducees and Pharisees -which here is played out in a judicial context. 21 But the point to note in all this is the fact that these indigenous elite figures chose to go to other authority figures, most notably the Roman procurator, in trying to win their own power struggles. To come back to the arguments set out above: this was a trial and execution of non-Roman citizens on a matter in which Romans would have had very little interest. As such, it is plausible that Ananus could have got away with this if no one had objected. It has already been noted that, if successful, this could also have had implications for jurisdictional limits in the future: Ananus and indeed other Judaean authorities could refer to this council and execution as a precedent for future actions. 21 Reference might, perhaps, be made with extreme caution to Acts 23:6, in which Paul apparently tries to capitalize on this antagonism by shifting the debate to one on which he knows the two factions will be opposed: that of resurrection of the dead.
Civil Strife, Power and Authority
But the opposing faction is willing to surrender the judicial power Ananus had attempted to claim in order to bolster their own position within the region.
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Although this judicial authority was claimed by Ananus as part of his own factional power-battle, it was also judicial authority in itself, which could have been important for Judaean autonomy more generally. But nevertheless, this faction of Judaeans informs Albinus of the limits, about which it is not otherwise clear he would have been aware. Thus, the implications of this passage for defining Roman-Judaean relations are two-fold: 1) Josephus presents certain factions within Judaean society at this time as willing to appeal to Roman imperial authorities in order to win what are essentially internal power struggles, and 2) he implies that these people also apparently thought it worth conceding to outsiders the judicial authority that could otherwise (potentially) have been won in order to bolster their own position, or at least make sure their opponents did not win by it. In Josephusʼ narrative, the prospect of future wider juridical powers is sacrificed in favour of winning internal, factional disputes.
Lest this seem like a desperate tactic, it should be observed that it was not, in fact, unheard of. Herod the Great, in his frequent prosecutions of his sons, had constant recourse to the Romans when he transacted these proceedings. There was in these interactions a constant balance of authority, with Herod asserting at all times his rights to do exactly as he pleased with his sons, but also waiting for confirmation of these rights from Augustus before actually acting.
23 If he did have the right to act -as he claimed -his deference had the potential practical effect of actually weakening this legal power, and making it contingent on Roman authority in a way that it had not been before. This was necessary in view of Herodʼs general reliance on the Roman imperial powers in sustaining his position within his kingdom, but it also meant that there was a possibility that he -in practical terms at least -ceded judicial authority in order to maintain his internal social and political power.
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This exploration of Judaean power bases, struggles and relations to the imperial authorities is therefore far from unique to this episode in Josephusʼ work, 32 This also fits with Josephusʼ emphasis in the Antiquitates on the Jews themselves being responsible for the calamity of the war and the destruction of the Temple, as opposed to some unrepresentative Jews and some unrepresentative Romans, as he had argued in the Bellum: on this subject, see the arguments of Schwartz (2011) passim, but especially at 300-302, who focuses particularly on this chapter of Josephusʼ Antiquitates as an illustration. 33 Ios. ant. Iud. 20.180 (ὡς ἐν ἀπροστατήτῳ πόλει). See also Ios. ant. Iud. 20.181: "To this degree did the violence of the seditious prevail over all right and justice" (οὕτως ἐκράτει τοῦ δικαίου παντὸς ἡ τῶν στασιαζόντων βία); this is picked up again after the James episode at Ios. ant. Iud 20.214, where the city is described as sick (ἐξ ἐκείνου μάλιστα τοῦ καιροῦ συνέβη τὴν πόλιν ἡμῶν νοσεῖν προκοπτόντων πάντων ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον). 34 Mason (1992) 175 suggests that Ananus is characterized more harshly in this episode than he is portrayed in the Bellum for precisely the reason that Josephus wishes to emphasize the lawlessness of Judaean leaders in the Antiquitates.
Civil Strife, Power and Authority long after this passage, after Josephus has recounted how the king assembled another council, which allowed the Levites to wear linen robes:
πάντα δ᾽ ἦν ἐναντία ταῦτα τοῖς πατρίοις νόμοις, ὧν παραβαϑέντων οὐκ ἐνῆν μὴ οὐχὶ δίκας ὑποσχεῖν. "Now all this was contrary to the laws of our country, which, whenever they have been transgressed, we have never been able to avoid the punishment of such transgressions."
35
This first council episode therefore serves in part as precursor to the second one, in which Josephus explicitly stated the ancestral laws had been contravened, to the peril of all. But it also encapsulates the themes that run throughout this particular part of the narrative, building on the strife that Josephus had shown was wrecking the whole of society and bringing it on to the judicial stage. The civil conflicts are thus shown to be spilling over into all spheres of life, including the juridical. Furthermore, the later comment on punishment for transgressions of the law puts this episode into sharper focus in retrospect: one issue confronting the Judaeans might be that if there is dispute on how to interpret or enforce their law in the first place, in the midst of this general confusion, it became even harder to avoid transgressions. Once readers came to the above comment, the crisis building in Judaean society at this particular time would have been made to seem all the more acute.
Framing a Legal Complaint
Nevertheless, the dispute over the way in which the Sadducees, or Ananus at least, interpret their ancestral law is not the point on which their opponents make their complaints. As has already been noted, there is little doubt that, in Josephusʼ retelling of the incident, one internal issue at stake was that of the interpretation of the ancestral law of the Judaeans -strictly or otherwise, depending on the group involved. 36 Furthermore, differences in the interpretation and enforcement of the ancestral law is one element commonly emphasized by Josephus in his description of the groups in Judaean society elsewhere, 37 though rarely -if ever - Martin (1988) lxiii; see also Bauckham (1999) 222, "a difference in interpretation of the law between Sadducees and Pharisees must be at stake"; cf. Bernheim (1997) 249. 37 See, for example, the episode at Ios. ant. Iud. 13.293-4, in which there is a difference of opinion between the Sadducees and Pharisees as to the severity of the punishment merited.
comes up in accounts of trials and judicial decisions in his work more generally.
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As such, the foregrounding of this motif is certainly significant. But in fact there is a difference between the matter of internal dispute and that which is taken to the Roman imperial authorities, 39 leading us to identify two different legal spheres, or ideas of ‚law' at work in the episode. There are two separate strands of argument in this passage. It is not here stated that Ananus has done anything to contradict the nomoi specifically: his opponents are uncomfortable with the strictness of the law as Ananus applies it (περὶ τοὺς νόμους ἀκριβεῖς βαρέως ἤνεγκαν) but they do not argue that he has truly broken these laws.
40 Instead, when turning to Agrippa and to Albinus, they state somewhat ambiguously to Agrippa that he had not acted correctly (μηδὲ γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον ὀρϑῶς αὐτὸν πεποιηκέναι) and in addressing Albinus, they claim it was not permitted (οὐκ ἐξὸν ἦν) for Ananus to assemble a council without the procuratorʼs consent. Their argument to the two ‚higher' authorities is therefore not centred on interpretations of Judaean ancestral law, but instead is framed in terms of the juridical competencies that are allowed to the High Priest at this time.
41 This is perfectly understandable as a way of approaching a Roman authority figure, who would surely have little interest in disputes over the interpretation of the Torah, but to Agrippa II, also a Judaean figure, it is more noteworthy and could perhaps fit in with general interpretations of this king as more Roman than Judaean in his loyalties. Or, at least, Josephus here presents his subjects as having viewed him in this way. This fits with our understanding of legal tactics and argumentation in antiquity more generally. Josephus here depicts Judaeans ranging across legal 38 These accounts are rather numerous and cannot all be detailed here, but there is a cluster of narratives concerning trials in the Herodian books of the Antiquitates, including that of , the sons (Ios. ant. , with execution at 394; 17.89-133 (Antipater), execution at 187, and Herodʼs own appearance before a synedrion after killing the bandits in c. 47 B. C. E. (Ios. ant. Iud. 14.159-84). 39 As touched upon by Mason (1992) 176, 181, who notes that the complaint as directed to the governor was, "a technicality that would be sure to raise the ire of the new governor and so remove Ananus from office" (citation at 176). 40 Thus, we should be cautious in accepting Burkhillʼs (1956) 92 interpretation: he argues that the opponents thought Ananusʼ acts "had no legal justification", in terms of religious law and that, if James and his companions had committed any crime, it was a political offence (though advancing to a slightly different conclusion, Rivkin (1975) 185 also draws a distinction between ‚political' and ‚religious' offences in his reading of the passage). In fact, Ananusʼ opponents appear to be more concerned about the strictness of the interpretation, which is a slightly different matter from suggesting Ananus and his followers had no legal justification at all. 41 See Masonʼs (1992) 176, 181 comments (see above, n. 39).
spheres in order to make their case effectively. They pick an argument that they think will be most favourably received by the particular authority they choose to approach -the Roman procurator. Their issue with Ananus is rather different in nature: they try to counter his attempt to impose his (Sadducean) interpretation of their own ancestral laws on others, but are also aware that this would not wash with a Roman figure, who would not care about disputes about exact interpretations of native law. Here, as elsewhere, people were pragmatic in their ‚choice of law', and especially how they framed their arguments. They wanted, fundamentally, to win and would usually be willing to range across legal traditions in order to do so.
42 This faction of Judaeans is willing to frame their complaint to the Roman procurator in Roman jurisdictional terms, which hides their real concern about the growing influence of a Judaean faction who differ in their interpretation of the (ancestral, Judaean) law. By doing so, they also present themselves as a group of Roman allies, hopefully winning further support in the future.
Concluding Remarks
Accounts of judicial proceedings in historical works often have a specific historiographical purpose, and thus must be considered within their narrative context. In this case, Josephus evidently chooses to recount this incident in the way he does in order to build upon themes that he has already begun to emphasize in his narrative. This episode must be understood as part of his effort to build a picture of a society increasingly riven by civil strife, and encapsulates the idea that such strife spills over into all aspects of society, including legal institutions. Everything is up for grabs in these internal power struggles, the judicial realm included.
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In particular, the actions of Ananusʼ opponents fit with what has been observed more broadly in studies of legal pluralism in antiquity: namely, that ancient agents most normally took pragmatic, flexible attitudes towards legal ar-42 Cf. the observations of Humfress (unpublished) , on the tactics used in the Dionysia papyrus (P. Oxy 2.237). Reference should also be made to the strategies employed by Babatha, a Judaean woman living in Roman Arabia, whose paperwork has survived for us: she appears to have ranged across legal traditions, even employing what we might view as traditionally ‚Roman' legal instruments (for example P. Yadin 28-30, a ‚Roman' actio tutelae) in her litigation against the guardians of her orphaned son: see, for example, Cotton (1993) on the legal context of this case. 43 As an aside, the close fit of this passage thematically into the general narrative context should further contradict those who have argued against its authenticity based on apparent inconsistency in characterization or unrealistic behaviour by its main actors.
gumentation. This meant that Judaeans were willing to frame their arguments in Roman jurisdictional terms, and very readily took their disputes to the imperial authorities, even to the point of potentially conceding judicial power that might otherwise have been (re-)claimed. This in turn gives us a glimpse into how indigenous elitesʼ relationship with the Romans could be developed, used or indeed challenged in the judicial sphere. In this, there does not seem to have been one single attitude: Ananus and his opponents use the Roman authoritiesʼ presence or absence in very different ways. But most notable in this episode is the manner in which Josephus describes jurisdictional boundaries being policed, negotiated and even constructed or conceded through encounters between indigenous and imperial agents.
This, indeed, fits observations that have been made from the broader realm of Roman legal scholarship. In recent years, a distinct strand of work within this sphere has begun to take a more ‚socio-legal' approach to the study of law. Law is considered not just doctrinally but as a social institution, or as "law within lived experience".
44 Within this newer orientation, particular efforts have been made to tackle our own ideas about how ‚law' was made and by whom, problematizing past conceptions that have relied on a rather statist approach. Within newer debates, it is recognized that a broader range of agents had an effect on defining the exact rules of law, by bringing their own interpretations of legal rules to the table and, through negotiations, challenges or complaints, attempting to win legitimacy for their own particular interpretations and understandings. 45 In this way, juridical rules are not seen as non-existent but as part of a sphere that is determined -at least in part -through interactions and negotiations. I would argue that this is what we see in this particular episode within Josephusʼ history: in a moment of change and uncertainty -the Roman absence -different factions within Judaean society seize their opportunity to negotiate jurisdictional boundaries. But within this broader field, the episode also has a particular value for historians interested in ancient ideas and attitudes towards law. Indeed, this has 44 Humfress (unpublished) 8. Recent studies that take this more socio-legal approach include the monographs by Bryen (2011) , which focus on the Egyptian papyri in particular. The work of Caroline Humfress should also be especially noted as bringing in modern legal theory: see, for example, Humfress (2013); Humfress (2011) . The ‚legal pluralism' or ‚multi-legalism' literature has proven particularly popular. For general overviews of the state of this subject in the modern realm, see: Twining (2010); Berman (2009); Shahar (2008); Galanter (1981) is also a classic point of reference in this field. 45 See especially the recent contribution of Bryen (2014) on this subject, particularly his emphasis on reconsidering what we define as a legal source in this context and his advocacy of a greater focus on narratives.
Civil Strife, Power and Authority become an increasingly legitimate and important focus in these newer studies of law in antiquity. 46 There always is a tension in any study of these narrative accounts between the narrative itself and historical reality. I would argue that the way judicial institutions and interactions are talked about and presented in Josephusʼ narrative is unlikely to be entirely divorced from everyday realities. But even on a much weaker reading -of this as narrative and narrative alone -it still represents a valuable ancient view on the ways in which such legal incidents could play out, showing how judicial institutions were viewed and discussed by contemporaries. If this seems a small contribution, it is not. When we truly take the legal realm to be embedded in its broader societal and historical contexts, and take seriously claims that ‚law' is determined by a much broader category of agents than previously imagined, this evidence not only can but must be taken into consideration. The ways people thought about, talked about and generally envisioned the legal realm had a direct bearing on the way we understand its functioning in antiquity. How Josephus constructed legal argumentation, tactics, loci and negotiations of authority, and the processes by which jurisdictional boundaries were thought to have been identified and enforced then become vitally important to understanding the broader legal landscape of Palestine under Roman imperial rule.
